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ABSTRACT The creation of the Single European Market has been accompanied by an
intense discussion on whether market-creating measures have been privileged over market-
correcting ones by the institutional system of the EU. The creation of an ‘Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) launched by the Treaty of Amsterdam poses a similar
question which, however, has remained heavily under-researched: will the balance between
policing competencies and individual rights shift towards the former at the expense of the
latter? Recent work on the ‘new raison d’e´tat’ and the strengthening of national executives
in processes of Europeanisation points in this direction. This essay explores the parallels
between the Common Market and the AFSJ with regard to the relationship between the
structures and substance of governance. The balance between security and individual rights
is scrutinised in the main pillars of the AFSJ: asylum cooperation, judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and police cooperation.
Introduction
The creation of the Single European Market (SEM) has been accompanied by
an intense discussion on whether market-creating measures are privileged over
market-correcting measures by the institutional system of the EU.2 The results
of such an imbalance would be alarming to everybody concerned with the
welfare state and a ‘European social model’. The creation of an ‘Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) launched by the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997/1999) poses a similar question: will the balance between security
considerations and individual rights shift towards the former at the expense
of the latter? The tension between security and freedom is constitutive of any
liberal democracy, and the balance found between these two paradigms has
differed across time and across states. What is the balance between security and
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freedom in the emerging European multilevel polity and its endeavours to
create a European public order? Which are the factors impacting on this
balance?
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) are amongst the most recent areas of
cooperation in the EU and have rapidly developed from a peripheral aspect into
a core priority of the European integration process. The rise of Justice and
Home Affairs symbolises the shift from a predominantly economic to a
political Union. In recent years, this symbolic shift has been taken up as a new
source of legitimisation for further European integration. This is reflected in
the Commission’s Assessment of the Tampere Programme in June 2004, which
described the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as ‘one of
the most outstanding expressions of the transition from an economic Europe to
a political Europe at the service of its citizens’3. The Convention drafting the
Constitutional Agreement coined the phrase of an emerging ‘European public
order’, which shall respond to the citizens’ desire for security and reflect the
values of freedom and justice to which the Union is committed.
Indeed, over the last 15 years, a considerable amount of common
instruments, cooperation frameworks, networks and agencies have developed,
which have led scholars to compare the dynamism implied in the creation of an
AFSJ with that of the Single Market.4 Originally developed at a purely
intergovernmental level, this cooperation has gradually been brought closer to
the structures of the European Community and its supranational procedures.
External events, such as the Kosovo refugee crisis or the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001, have been catalysts in this development. Yet, in contrast to
many other areas of European integration, inter- or trans-governmental forms
of governance between ministerial and operational actors below the level of
state representatives have proved particularly resilient in this policy field,
opening these actors to new contexts for cooperation beyond public and
judicial scrutiny.5
This essay argues that the multilevel, incomplete EU polity has opened up an
arena in which law-enforcement agencies of the member states have been able to
prioritise securitarian objectives over the protection of individual rights and
liberties in Justice and Home Affairs. The theoretical explanation for this
development rests in a combination of intergovernmentalist accounts on the
new raison d’e´tat in the processes of Europeanisation with an institutionalist
analysis of the structural determinants, which favour securitarian over liberal
orientations. Here, as well as in the subsequent empirical analysis, we will draw
a number of analogies with the development of the Single Market, which have
favoured a neoliberal agenda over social-democratic goals. We start with a
general discussion of the dynamics of internationalisation and securitisation in
JHA. We then retrace the permeation of specific modes of governance known
from the Single Market to the AFSJ and highlight their effects on the balance
between freedom and security in policy-making. The final section documents
these dynamics in the three main pillars of the AFSJ: asylum policy, judicial
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cooperation in criminal law, and police cooperation. This analysis will point at
the limits of what shall become the European public order in the incomplete
European polity.
Europeanisation and Securitisation
Influential strands of the International Relations and European Studies
literature see cooperation and integration as a progressive achievement over
the retrograde forces of nationalism. This is especially the case for liberal and
functionalist scholars, who emphasise the higher collective rationality of
cooperative arrangements. Particularly since the Danish voters’ rejection of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and most forcefully since the French and Dutch
‘no’ to the Constitutional Treaty, however, scholars of European Union politics
have become more concerned with a ‘dark side of intergovernmental coopera-
tion’,6 namely that ‘international cooperation tends to redistribute domestic
political resources toward executives’.7 Whereas the ‘Community method’ of
European integration tends to give the Commission, the European Parliament
and the European Court of Justice a certain counter-balance to the
predominance of national executives in the Council of Ministers, JHA is a
field characterised by an inter- or transgovernmental mode of policy making.8
From this perspective, internationalisation may have the counter-intuitive
effect to ‘strengthen the executive by establishing an additional political arena
which is dominated by government representatives’.9 This interpretation
contradicts conventional accounts of international cooperation, which asso-
ciate it with a loss of state autonomy and transfers of sovereignty. Government
representatives gain autonomy, because their action at the international level is
shielded from the pluralistic domestic arena, where they compete with other
actors on the ‘right’ interpretation of social problems and the balance between
competing policy objectives, such as considerations of security versus indivi-
dual rights. By acting jointly at the intergovernmental level, national executives
gain an information advantage over their domestic counterparts and act in the
capacity of gatekeeper. Usually gathering representatives from the same
ministries, intergovernmental cooperation frameworks are often relatively
homogeneous and thus favour particular policy options over others. According
to this logic, the purpose of international cooperation hence is not necessarily
the search for functionally superior collective policy solutions, as conventional
cooperation theory would predict. Nor is it the search for effective and
legitimate governance at a higher level, as the more recent governance literature
scrutinises.10 The ‘escape to Europe’ rather results from a ‘new raison d’e´tat’,11
which consists of the strengthening of particular governmental actors and their
preferred policy agenda over other parts of the domestic constituency, including
other sections of the public bureaucracies, but also parliament, political parties
or courts. In the field of law and order, this shift is anything but trivial, since it
amounts to a reorganisation of the core of statehood, the monopoly over the
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legitimate use of violence (Weber), beyond the embedded liberalism of the
nation state.12
The autonomy-generating effects of internationalisation are especially strong
for democratic states, and may be particularly important in fields that are close
to their liberal core, such as justice and home affairs. In the area of immigration
policy, several authors have convincingly argued that two features of liberal
democracies, the existence of heterogeneous (organised) interests and the legal
rights conferred to different classes of migrants impose strict limits on the scope
of domestic policy reforms*and for the attempt to reject ‘unwanted
immigrants’.13 Recent analyses of European cooperation in asylum and
immigration matters confirm the autonomy-seeking behaviour of JHA officials
acting at the European level. Highlighting the interplay between domestic
politics and the developing European agenda, it was shown that the shift
‘upwards’ towards transgovernmental cooperation was motivated less by the
goal of a truly supranational immigration policy. Instead, it followed the desire
of particular sections of national bureaucracies to circumvent domestic
obstacles to political reforms, which resulted from the constitutional founda-
tions of humanitarian policy frames and their defence by political parties, the
courts and fellow ministries.14 Guiraudon aptly coins this strategy as an
instance of ‘venue-shopping’ through vertical policy-making. Apart from
opening new venues, the EU, as a normative project, also provides a powerful
source of legitimacy for such shifts. In the area of immigration this became very
clear, for example in a ruling of the German Constitutional Court of 1996,
which justified limitations of the constitutional asylum right as a basis for a
comprehensive European refugee policy aiming at the establishment of a system
of burden-sharing among the participating states*a distant goal still ten years
later.15
Similar dynamics are also at play with other aspects of JHA, such as the
current Draft Framework Decision on communications data retention, which is
not only hotly debated among human rights activists,16 but has met with fierce
rejection in the European Parliament.17 The attempt by the British Home
Secretary Clark (during Britain’s EU Presidency) to persuade the Parliament of
this instrument is symptomatic of the securitisation discourse surrounding
JHA: ‘In conclusion, I believe that ‘‘no’’ votes against the Constitution should
be taken as a wake up call to those who believe and support the value of the
European project to focus on what matters. The right to safety and security is a
fundamental concern for our citizens. Here we can show that Europe can and
does deliver real benefits.’18
Even when agreements require ratification by national governments, such as
Europol’s protocol on privileges and immunities, rejection faces prohibitive
costs once an agreement has been reached. Members of the Bundestag, the
German Parliament, were extremely concerned about granting immunity to
Europol officers. Nevertheless, the protocol was ratified because the Europol
convention could not enter into force otherwise and a strengthening of Justice
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and Home Affairs was considered to be an important part of Germany’s EU
policy. According to Wilhelm Knelangen, the government was ‘in a superior
position because by pointing to Germany’s broader interests in EU politics, it
could confer additional legitimacy on an issue that was heavily debated
domestically’.19
There is no doubt that questions of immigration, organised crime or
terrorism have become securitised.20 The notion of securitisation does not a
priori deny the presence of threats, but emphasises the social processes by which
issues become perceived and handled as security matters.21 By ‘securitising’ an
issue, governments claim special prerogatives in dealing with it. Our argument
is that by insulating actors interested in the maximisation of internal security
from those concerned with the safeguarding of individual rights, and offering a
‘compensatory’ normative frame of legitimation, Europeanisation contributes
to a securitisation of the issues falling under the heading of JHA.
Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees have shown that the discourse within the
European Union is indeed biased towards security. At first glance, the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice envisioned in the Amsterdam Treaty comprises
three aims on an equal footing. However, Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees
demonstrate that the concept of security ‘appears to underpin the concepts
of both freedom and justice’. They are concerned that this discourse ‘may lead
to a proliferation of repressive, undemocratic measures which potentially
threaten civil liberties and are justified through recourse to the elusive and
easily manipulated premise of ‘freedom from threat’.22 The same criticism was
voiced more recently by the UK’s House of Lords in its recent Report on the
Hague Programme laying down the objectives for JHA cooperation for the next
five years: ‘Criticism of the Hague Programme for placing undue emphasis on
security considerations at the expense of respect for fundamental right is
justified. . . . it is important that measures to protect citizens’ rights are not
sidelined in the implementation of the Programme.’23
As we argue below, this bias is not only due to the autonomy-seeking
behaviour of law and order officials in the multi-level constituency (as the new
raison d’e´tat argument would say), but also to the specific institutional
framework of the EU, and the diffusion of market-based modes of governance
to the domain of public order.
Negative and Positive Integration
The idea that Europeanisation privileges particular policy frames resonates
with the vast literature on the governance of the Common Market and its bias
towards neoliberal orientations. Fritz Scharpf in particular has argued that the
creation of the Common Market has been facilitated by a combination of treaty
commitments based on a neoliberal ideology and the empowerment of
supranational actors in implementing them. Particularly since the mid-1980s,
the European Commission has become more proactive in pushing back
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impediments to the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. In
doing so, the Commission was supported by the adjudication of the European
Court of Justice. Most importantly, in a 1979 landmark decision (‘Cassis de
Dijon’) the European Court of Justice established the principle of mutual
recognition which removed an important obstacle to intra-European trade,
namely the pluralism of national standards. As a consequence, market-creating
measures have become feasible without the explicit approval of the member
states whenever a national regulation is brought to the European Court of
Justice, which then declares the regulation to infringe upon the treaties.
In contrast to these measures of ‘negative integration’, however, measures of
‘positive integration’ were hampered by more demanding decision-making
procedures. Most importantly, market-correcting measures required the explicit
approval of the Council, deciding by either unanimity (for example on
minimum indirect taxes) or by qualified majority (for example on environ-
mental regulation).
The AFSJ project shows remarkable similarities to the Common Market
project. The most obvious one is the adoption of the principle of mutual
recognition. Although already endorsed with regard to asylum policy since the
1990 Dublin Convention, at the 1999 Tampere European Council the member
states declared that ‘mutual recognition’ should ‘become the cornerstone of
judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union’.24
With the implementation of this principle, a major obstacle to cross-border law
enforcement is removed because different national criminal codes (such as
gathering evidence, pre-trial detention, standards of proofs and punishment,
judicial records) no longer obstruct judicial cooperation between member
states. Thus, mutual recognition in judicial cooperation can be expected to have
the same effect as in the Common Market: differing standards, for example
regarding defendants’ rights, no longer inhibit the transnational prosecution of
suspects. However, one important caveat has to be mentioned: for the creation
of the Common Market, the principle of mutual recognition has been made
particularly effective by endowing the European Commission with the exclusive
right to make legislative proposals and by empowering the European Court of
Justice to review member states’ compliance with their commitments. In
contrast, the supranational institutions have been deliberately marginalised in
EU internal security politics. As a result, the principle of mutual recognition
cannot be enforced against member states’ opposition and accompanying
‘positive integration’ measures, such as the approximation of laws, are much
more difficult to obtain.
As documented in the empirical analysis below, the application of the
principle of mutual recognition in core areas of national sovereignty is indeed
delicate as it presupposes recognition of the ‘equivalence’, ‘compatibility’ or (at
least) ‘acceptability’ of a counterpart’s public order.25 The fact that its
introduction in the area of criminal law was proposed by the UK in order to
facilitate cooperation without harmonisation suggests that this instrument does
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not challenge the states’ sovereignty. Yet, as Kalypso Nicolaı¨dis suggests,
mutual recognition ‘is meant to respect sovereignty on the one hand’ (by
foregoing the option of total harmonisation and centralisation), ‘while radically
reconfiguring such sovereignty on the other’*by delinking the exercise of
authoritative power ‘from the territorial anchor of sovereignty’.26 From this
perspective, the exercise of mutual recognition constitutes ‘a reciprocal
allocation of jurisdictional authority to prescribe and to enforce’27 or a
‘horizontal transfer of sovereignty’.28
As with the Single Market, negative integration and mutual recognition
presupposes a number of ‘market-correcting’ or positive integration measures.
These usually take the form of minimum standards, which are binding on all
Member States. As Majone argues, harmonisation (or approximation through
minimum standards) and mutual recognition are complementary mechanisms
of integration.29
In the AFSJ, the principle of mutual recognition is based on the assumption
that the member states meet the standards of human rights protection set out in
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).30 Yet, this of course
does not preclude important differences in substantive and procedural asylum
or criminal law in the member states, which renders the comparability of
jurisdictions questionable (see the examples below). As shown below, there is
also no EU mechanism so far for monitoring and ensuring that these principles
are observed in practice in the member states. Other problems with this line of
reasoning arise from the inconsistent ratification by the member states of
Protocol 7 ECHR, which contains some fundamental due process rights.31
The need for minimum standards in the AFSJ has been recognised, but faces
much higher institutional (and probably also ideational) hurdles towards
adoption than in the Single Market. This is due to the specific modes of
governance that have emerged in this area, which reflect member states’
concern to safeguard sovereignty over these core aspects of statehood and
which have been referred to as intensive transgovernmentalism.32 Suprana-
tional procedures that ease the adoption of common binding measures have
been introduced only for those issues falling under the ‘first pillar’ and have
become effective only from 2005 onwards. Until then, and still for all other
issues remaining in the third pillar, the Commission has to share its right of
initiative with the member states, the Council decides by unanimity, and the
European Parliament has no right of co-decision. Whereas after the Amster-
dam Treaty there has been a shift from non-binding forms of cooperation to
legally binding instruments, a second specificity of this field is the considerable
importance of operational cooperation and coordination below or beyond
legislative action. This operational cooperation, which is not further defined in
the treaties, occurs through little accountable networks of justice and home
affairs officials in form of common operations such as border controls or joint
investigations, or through the creation of special agencies and coordination
bodies such as the European police service, Europol, the European body for
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judicial cooperation, Eurojust, the European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at External Borders, the Task Force of Police Chiefs.
Finally, JHA cooperation continues to be promoted outside the institutional
framework of the EU. The most recent transgovernmental initiative is the
conclusion of the so-called ‘Schengen III’ Treaty among Belgium, Germany,
Spain, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Austria in May 2005.
Although the EU Treaty provides for the possibility of enhanced cooperation,
this initiative will contribute to the deepening of cross-border cooperation, in
particular in the fields of the fight against terrorism, cross-border criminal
activities and illegal migration, outside the EU framework, at a purely
transgovernmental level.
Due to this hybrid pattern of transgovernmentalism, supranational policy-
making and operational cooperation between law enforcement agencies, JHA
opens a considerably greater leeway for the ‘escape route’ of internationalisa-
tion identified by authors such as Klaus-Dieter Wolf and Andrew Moravcsik as
discussed above. Firstly, the rule of unanimity renders any legally binding
agreement which is higher than the lowest common denominator unlikely, even
if the initial proposal by the Commission is more balanced. The weakness of
judicial and parliamentary control adds to this. This is clearly visible in all
‘minimum standards’ which have been adopted so far in the now ‘commu-
nitarised’ areas of asylum and immigration.33 In the area of criminal justice,
too, the introduction of mutual recognition has preceded the adoption of
common legal and procedural standards*and many member states indeed see
it as an alternative to common measures. Apart from the weakness of
harmonisation measures, the second feature of intensive transgovernmentalism,
the importance of operational cooperation, excludes a priori the occurrence of
positive integration, and with it that of legal scrutiny through the European
Court of Justice. Instead, the philosophy backing this cooperation is that trust
and compatible standards of rights and punishments will occur ‘by default’
through the socialising impact of every-day interaction. The analysis below
shows the limits of ‘negative integration’ in these core functions of statehood,
not only in terms of practical implementation, but also democratic account-
ability and legitimacy.
Gaps and Imbalances in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
This section highlights the problems implied in establishing an AFSJ on the
basis of negative integration and mutual recognition and identifies some of the
gaps emerging from the attempt to shift refugee protection, criminal prosecu-
tion or police cooperation out of the constitutional framework of the nation
state. Whereas in all three areas, Europeanisation has entailed a vast array of
measures, we focus on three core instruments: the system of responsibility
allocation for asylum procedures (Dublin Convention and Regulation); the
EU’s extradition regime based on the European arrest warrant; and Europol’s
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personal data regime. The conclusion of this essay recapitulates the limits of
these instruments and addresses the prospects for a redress of this bias towards
internal security to the benefit of individual rights and civil liberties.
The European Asylum System
Asylum is an intriguing institution from the point of view of human rights and
state sovereignty. Unlike the broader phenomenon of migration, which occurs
on a voluntary basis, the notion of asylum derives from international human
rights and republican understandings between the state and the people.
Together with the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum constitutes
the only exception to the sovereign right of states to select the admission of
non-nationals on their territory. This exception is codified in the customary
norm of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of individuals to a place
where they fear inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or persecution
on defined grounds.
The core of the so-called European asylum system is a system of
responsibility allocation for the examination of asylum claims between the
member states, codified first in the 1990 Dublin Convention and since 2003 the
so-called Dublin II Regulation.34
This system establishes objective criteria, which determine the single
responsibility of only one member state for the examination of an asylum
claim. The other member states are then dispensed from their obligations
towards the applicant and may hand over the person to the responsible state.
Although officially the term of mutual recognition has not been applied to this
system, the member states implicitly acknowledge recognition of the others’
asylum determination procedures when applying this rule. The ‘Dublin’ system
thus breaks with the basic principle of international refugee law, which
centralised the responsibility not to refoule as well as the right to grant asylum
within the sovereign state. This principle is replaced by an unspecified notion of
transnational responsibility based on the mutual recognition of asylum systems.
As with the other areas of JHA, where mutual recognition was later formally
introduced, this exchangeability of legal responsibilities and liberal commit-
ments is not self-evident. In a number of countries, the ratification of the
Dublin Convention entailed the introduction of a formal exception to the
constitutional asylum right. Furthermore, its implementation presupposes
the equivalence or at least compatibility or acceptability of asylum determina-
tion standards among the member states. In reality, however, there is great
variation between the level of procedural safeguards granted during the asylum
procedure and in the interpretation of what constitutes a refugee. Such
difficulties have been pronounced prominently by British courts. The Court
of Appeal stated in 1998 that the discrepancies of approach between the various
Member States to the criteria of protection should not to be taken into
consideration unless deemed ‘outside the range of tolerance’ and unless
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affecting proper application of the Geneva Convention (R v. SSHD, ex parte
Iyadurai, 1998 INLR 472). In 1999, the Court of Appeal quashed the Home
Office’s decision to transfer several applicants to France and Germany on the
basis that these two countries do not acknowledge persecution by non-state
agents as grounds for granting refugee status. In its decision (R v. SSHD, ex
parte Adan, Subaskaran and Aitseguer, 1999 INLR 472), the Court noted that
the applicants concerned could, in principle, have been entitled to refugee status
in the United Kingdom, whereas this was not possible in Germany and France
because of their restrictive policies.35 Of course, the cases of rejected asylum
seekers who would have had better chances to be admitted in another Member
State than that determined as responsible under the Dublin system are not
known.
Although the need to harmonise procedural and substantive law had been
stressed early on by the Commission and the European Parliament, it took
eight years after entry into force of the Dublin Convention to draft a directive
on asylum procedures,36 which is however still not formally adopted. The draft
report of the European Parliament’s Committee for Civil Liberties is indicative
of the limits of this ‘positive integration’ measure. Although conceding that the
need for such a directive was undisputed, it argued that various provisions in
the proposal are a threat to human rights standards and principles of refugee
law, because they contained too many exceptions. The Rapporteur also
complained that the Council had not consulted the EP before reaching political
agreement and asked the Committee to consider whether legal advice should be
sought on challenging the Directive before the European Court of Justice.37
These concerns have been echoed by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, the international agency in charge of the international refugee
regime, who has found the draft asylum procedures directive to be in breach
with international law.38
The Governance of Extradition
Extradition is the most important means of international legal assistance in
criminal matters. Its reform was therefore assigned high priority by the EU
member states. After having reached a general agreement on the principle of
mutual recognition at the Tampere European Council in 1999, the European
arrest warrant that the member states endorsed in late 2001 was the first
application of this principle.
Before the arrest warrant was introduced, manifold obstacles to extradition
were in place: the principle of sovereignty has emphasised that states do not
share a common legal order, but that each of them has a distinct legal order of
its own which is not necessarily respected by other states. Because another
state’s legal order is generally perceived as ‘alien’, there is no reason why a state
should contribute to its effectiveness by extraditing persons who have fled its
jurisdiction. As a consequence, the decision whether to grant extradition to
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another state has traditionally been an exclusive right of sovereign states. Even
in constitutional states in which governments may not extradite a person if the
presiding court has denied its admissibility, governments remain free to refuse
extradition where it is admissible. Instead of extraditing, states may grant
asylum to the requested person. In practice, however, states have passed a large
number of bilateral treaties that are usually guided by the following principles:
first, extradition is only granted on the condition that the requesting state will
do the same in comparable cases (principle of reciprocity or do ut des). Second,
a person is extradited only if the offence under consideration is punishable in
both the requesting and the requested state (principle of double or dual
criminality). This principle highlights the perceived ‘alieness’ of other states’
legal orders, which necessitates a new examination of whether the requested
person can be considered a fugitive from justice in the first place.
Spain took a leadership role in establishing the mutual recognition of court
judgements as a new principle in European extradition law. According to that
principle, states consider each other’s legal and judicial system trustworthy
enough as to recognise any request for extradition without the many reserva-
tions that have remained part of European extradition law. The principle of
mutual recognition implies the abolition of the principle of double criminality: a
person must be extradited even if the offence under consideration is not
punishable in the requested state. The principle of mutual recognition thus
serves to enhance the security in areas that pose a particular problem in some
though not all members states, for example membership in terrorist organisa-
tions for which some member states do not have respective legislation.
At the 1999 special European Council in Tampere, the member states
endorsed the principle of mutual recognition as a basis for future judicial
cooperation.39 The European Commission’s ‘proposal for a European arrest
warrant’,40 which the Tampere European Council had asked for and which has
been based on the principle of mutual recognition, was tabled in September
2001. Under the impression of the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington, agreement was reached within an extraordinarily short period
of merely three months. The most important feature of the European arrest
warrant is that the requirement of dual criminality, which had been the most
prominent impediment to extradition, is replaced with the principle of mutual
recognition of court judgements among EU member states. Moreover,
extradition is facilitated by abolishing the political phase inherent in any
extradition procedure and by allowing for direct communication between the
issuing and the executing judicial authorities. Without doubt, the European
arrest warrant improves the prosecution of suspects by eliminating the most
common obstacles for extradition among the EU member states. The arrest
warrant has been designed to bring criminals to court, who would otherwise
escape justice because of obstacles in the extradition procedure. In this regard,
the arrest warrant is a welcome innovation to make extradition among the EU
member states more effective.
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However, there is a thin line between making existing criminal law more
effective on the one hand and making it less liberal on the other hand. Two
cases, both concerned with the persecution of terrorists, may serve as examples.
In the first case, the arrest warrant has served to close down a loophole in the
combat of terrorism; in Belgium, membership in a terrorist organisation had
been no crime. As a consequence, members of terrorist organisations tended to
use Belgium as a ‘safe heaven’ from persecution. The European arrest warrant
now obliges the Belgian authorities to arrest and surrender persons, who are
regarded as members of terrorist organisations in other EU countries.
The second case concerns Mamoun Darkanzali, who was born in Syria, later
became a German citizen and who was suspected of having provided logistical
and financial support to Al Qaeda. However, although German intelligence
collected evidence against Darkanzali, this evidence did not suffice to bring
Darkanzali to court. What is more, a Spanish request to extradite Darkanzali
was turned down, because German law did not allow for the extradition of
nationals. After the European Arrest Warrant had come into force, however,
the Spanish request was successfully renewed and, in October 2004, German
police arrested Darkanzali. In Spain, the burden of proof to arrest terrorist
suspects is reported to be lower. The European Arrest Warrant has made it
possible to have Darkanzali arrested on the basis of this lower burden of proof.
Darkanzali was not surrendered, however, because the Federal Constitutional
Court declared Germany’s European Arrest Warrant Act invalid. According to
the Court, ‘the legislature has not exhausted the margins afforded to it by the
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant in such a way that the
implementation of the Framework Decision for incorporation into national law
shows the highest possible consideration in respect of the fundamental right
concerned’ and ‘infringes the guarantee of recourse to a Court’ because the
decision to grant extradition could not be challenged.41
The fact that the European Arrest Warrant obliges member states to arrest
persons for offences that are not necessarily punishable in the arresting state has
raised concerns in many member states. Line Barfod of the Danish Enhedslisten
worried that mentally disabled or ill criminals who receive special treatment in
Denmark would have to be surrendered to common criminal treatment in other
member states.42 The German weekly magazine Der Spiegel claimed that a
Dutch doctor who actively assisted a terminally ill German in medicide in the
Netherlands would not commit a crime according to Dutch law, but could
nevertheless be surrendered to Germany for manslaughter. According to a
German criminal lawyer, the European Arrest Warrant makes the most punitive
law prevail across Europe.43 The problem may be compounded, if prosecutors
across the EU member states use Eurojust to issue arrest warrants in those
countries in which the burden of proof is the lowest.44
Extradition politics also illustrates the obstacles in adopting measures of
positive integration that are designed to re-balance law enforcement and
individual rights. The Commission has recognised that the introduction of a
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European Arrest Warrant (and the progressive implementation of the principle
of mutual recognition) should be accompanied by common standards of
defendants’ rights because
mutual recognition can only operate effectively in a spirit of confidence,
whereby not only the judicial authorities, but all actors in the criminal
process see decisions of the judicial authorities of other Member States as
equivalent to their own and do not call in question their judicial capacity
and respect for fair trial rights.45
Thus, the Commission has proposed a Framework Decision on procedural
rights applying to proceedings in criminal matters throughout the EU.46 The
proposal calls for minimum standards of access to legal advice, to interpreta-
tion and consular assistance as well as for notifying suspected persons of their
rights (‘letter of rights’). However, the prospects of having the proposal adopted
are rather low, given that a unanimous decision is required.
The Personal Data Regime in Police Cooperation
The European Police Office (Europol) has no executive powers. Thus, Europol
officers may not arrest suspects or conduct house searches. Instead, Europol’s
main task has been the exchange and analysis of data that are related to severe
forms of transnational crime.47 For that purpose, several data systems have
been established in The Hague. Europol’s information system assembles data
on suspected and sentenced persons. Member states’ police officers can access
the information system via national liaison bureaus. More important, however,
are Europol’s work files that are more comprehensive than files in the
information system. In addition to data on culprits, data on possible witnesses,
contact persons and victims may also be collected. Moreover, sensitive data,
such as ethnic origin, political or religious convictions, health and sexual
preferences, may be stored. Access to these work files is strictly limited to
Europol officers working in specific task forces, for example on ‘money
laundering’ or ‘Iraqi Kurds’. Work files are designed to investigate the
structures of organised crime, the results of which are then presented to the
member states which in turn can initiate investigations. Europol obtains data
from the member state police, third states and international organisations.
Although Europol officers may not arrest anybody or conduct house
searches, Europol’s data processing activities directly touch upon individual
rights. Data protection therefore plays a prominent role in the Europol
convention: first, the communication of data between the member states and
Europol is based on the respective member state’s data protection regime. Thus,
data that may not be processed or stored according to national law, may not be
shared with Europol either. Second, member states are obliged to ensure a
standard of data protection that at least corresponds to the standards of the
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Council of Europe’s ‘Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data’ of 1981. As a consequence, the
Council of Europe convention becomes a common minimum standard across
the member states. Third, Europol itself is also obliged to ‘take account of the
principles of the Council of Europe convention’ in ‘the collection, processing
and utilization of personal data’ (art. 14 (3) Europol-convention). Fourth,
operational agreements between Europol and third countries that include an
exchange of personal data can only be concluded if the third country’s level of
data protection meets the standards of the Council of Europe convention.
Finally, a ‘Joint Supervisory Body’ has been established to supervise the
compliance with these provisions.
To be sure, the establishment of a common minimum standard for data
protection has improved data protection in some countries of the EU. Although
the Council of Europe convention had been signed by most of the then EU
member states shortly after its negotiation, the ratification procedures in
several member states may have been accelerated by the parallel ratification of
the Europol convention. In the ten countries which became member states in
2004 the ratification of the Council of Europe convention may also have
benefited from the obligation arising from Europol.
However, for EU member states with a data protection standard above the
level of the Council of Europe convention, the Europeanisation of policing
tends to undermine this standard. Most importantly, the police in such high-
standard member states may, via Europol, receive personal data from
colleagues from low-standard member states which they would otherwise,
that is, according to their national standard of data protection, be prohibited
from storing or processing. Moreover, obligations to delete data within certain
periods can easily be circumvented. As a general rule, the institution
responsible for an entry into TECS (‘The Europol Computer System’) is also
in charge of its maintenance. This responsibility includes an obligation to delete
data if they are no longer true or if the maximum storage time has expired.
However, if another member institution adds further information to an entry, it
also assumes the responsibility for maintaining this entry. As a consequence,
data which would have been deleted according to the laws of the member state
making this entry in the first place may stay in TECS, if a member state with
longer maximum storage periods has updated this entry and thus assumed
responsibility for its maintenance.48 Finally, data processing at Europol is less
constrained than data processing in high-standard countries. In Germany, for
example, the Federal Constitutional Court has prohibited the use for repressive
purposes of data that were collected for preventive purposes.49 However, there
is no such provision in the Europol convention. As a consequence, the German
police may collect personal data for preventive purposes and may forward them
to Europol. These data may then be processed by Europol’s intelligence unit
and may, in combination with further data from other member states, be
reported back to the member states. In the final analysis and notwithstanding
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the Constitutional Court’s prohibition, data collected for preventive purposes
could trigger investigations in Germany. Thus, a cornerstone of Germany’s
personal data regime has been undermined in the process of Europeanisation.
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, the economic orientation of European integration has
increasingly been superseded by a security rationale. The EU’s commitment to
establish ‘a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice’
in particular has triggered a multitude of activities to make policing and law-
enforcement more effective in a European Union characterised by waning
internal border controls and a concomitant perception of increased vulner-
ability vis-a`-vis organised crime and other securitised phenomena, such as
irregular migration. With this security rationale, the legitimation discourse of
the European Union has also changed. The need to both respond to the
concerns of the citizens and guarantee a sentiment of ‘European public order’
has gained prominence. This discourse resonates with modern theories of the
state, which, since the seventeenth century, have drawn on its capacity to
provide security to its inhabitants.50
But what kind of ‘European public order’ is emerging? Reminiscent of the
‘new raison d’e´tat’ thesis,51 we argued that European integration opens up a
transgovernmental venue which allows national justice and home affairs
officials to pool their respective ‘monopolies over the use of violence’ while
shielding them from the established liberal norms and procedures that limit this
monopoly in national constitutions. As Elspeth Guild has put it, this system is
incomplete, because ‘it is only criminal judgements that have this power to cross
the border without risk of further control. The individual’s rights in respect of a
criminal charge, trial, and sentence remain bound within the territory of each
member state.’52 There are strong parallels with the Single Market, in which
goods, services, capital and EU citizens move freely, but where production
standards, social policies or pension systems remain nationally bound. As we
have argued, these parallels result from the diffusion of market-based
mechanisms of integration from the economic to the political field, that is,
an emphasis on negative integration and mutual recognition.
The mutual recognition of asylum procedures, criminal laws or warrants,
however, presupposes a high level of mutual trust in the member states’ judicial
systems. As our cases show, even among near neighbours who have a long
history of cooperation, this trust cannot be taken for granted.53 As long as
doubts remain about the proper respect for individual rights in other member
states, courts are unlikely to accept other states’ decisions without further
scrutiny and citizens are unlikely to welcome such a Europeanisation of internal
security cooperation as an advancement.54 Thus, there is a strong case for the
neofunctionalist notion that European cooperation in criminal law necessitates
a common approach to defendants’ rights, that European police-cooperation
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‘spills over’ into European level controls of data protection and asylum
cooperation needs an integrated asylum system. Legal approximation, as an
alternative or complement to mutual recognition, would have the advantage of
replicating the fundamental rights and guaranties found in national legal
system at the European level, enforceable through supranational judicial
control. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe would have been
a first step in that direction, particularly by incorporating the Charter on
Fundamental Rights into the Treaty and by giving the supranational institu-
tions a greater role in justice and home affairs. Recent plans to set up a
European Fundamental Rights Agency address the lack of monitoring
mechanisms limiting the newly acquired powers of transgovernmental actors.
Yet, it is not clear how far a mandate limited to the gathering and dissemination
of information, as currently planned, will make a real value added to already
existing human rights institutions.55 Finally, there are also limits to legal
approximation in these sensitive areas of national sovereignty, as the now
communitarised cases of asylum and immigration policy show. Minimum
standards are adopted on the lowest common denominator, and leave the
member states enough leeway to maintain nationally diverging practices.
To conclude, our analysis has shown that internationalisation and the new
raison d’e´tat in European integration poses a challenge not only for the balance
between state and market (Scharpf) or legislatives and executives (Wolf), but
also a third fundamental asset of European liberal democracies, the balance
between freedom and security. This raises the need to continue to study the
transformation of statehood under the influence of internationalisation and
Europeanisation, and to understand better the factors that contribute to a more
balanced transformation process. The politicisation of European integration
and the debates brought about by the Constitutional Treaty may be a first step
in this direction, and contribute to closer scrutiny of the relationship between
the modes and the substance of governance in the European Union.
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